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ABSTRACT
In this reflection, Professor Gerhart relates the ideas of the symposium contributors to his goals in writing Property Law and Social Morality. In doing
so, he reflects, in Part I, on his attempt to separate politics from private law
property theory, and, in Part II, on how his framework theory provides a
mechanism for integrating ideas about the content of legal doctrine from a
wide variety of intellectual disciplines. In the first Part of his reflection, Professor Gerhart comments on the corrective justice/distributive justice distinction, related theories of human flourishing, and on rights theories. In the
second Part of the reflection he comments on the theory of social recognition, the relationship between social values and the legal values, and the
relationship between how we do act and how we should act. He concludes
by reflecting on the attributes of a theory that draws different viewpoints
together rather than pitting one against another.

How gratifying it is that scholars as distinguished as the panelists
whom Texas A&M University Law School assembled for this symposium have taken the time to consider the ideas in my book, Property
Law and Social Morality. Each contributor brings a unique viewpoint
to the symposium, each had to make room in a busy schedule to grapple with my ideas, and each is both well-known and well-knowing in
property law. By articulating their agreements and disagreements,
each is willing to sharpen and shape the view of property theory that I
present. Intellectual engagement of this kind is rare in our profession,
where the norm is to note, but not engage, intellectual differences.
Each essay is a little gem that fully justifies the effort that I put into
writing the book. I am grateful to each of the panelists for their wisdom and willingness to exchange ideas.
And I am grateful to Texas A & M University Law School and the
Journal of Real Property Law for providing this forum. Special
thanks to the faculty advisors of the Journal, Professor Gabriel Eck† Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve School of Law.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V2.I2.8
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stein and Susan T. Phillips, to Professor Timothy Mulvaney, who carried the load in envisioning this symposium, and to the editorial staff
of the journal, its leader, David Sarnacki, and, especially, to Kourtney
Doman, the symposium planner and Sarah Burns, the symposium
editor.
In these reflections, I situate the panelist’s various perspectives and
ideas about property law in the context of my goals in writing Property Law and Social Morality. Part I of the reflection discusses my
effort to squeeze politics out of private law property theory by
presenting a theory of private law that is value-laden but not interestladen, one that does not start with a presumption for or against the
institution of private property. Here, I discuss why I chose to pursue a
theory of responsibility rather than a theory of rights–namely, because
of my belief that a theory of duty and no duty identifies the boundary
between rights and obligations. I also discuss my distinction between
corrective and distributive justice, which helps the reader understand
the distinction between the domain of private law (the book’s domain) and issues about the distribution of wealth, and I show why
blurring that distinction turns private law theory into a political rather
than an analytical enterprise. This situates the theory of my book with
respect to other property theories, including the theory of human
flourishing, and rights theories in the form of the right to exclude (for
owners) and to regulate (for the government). It also explains why
the Due Process Clause is the appropriate source of restrictions on
government land use regulation.
Part II of my reflection discusses the nature of my book’s framework theory. My book revolves around the important distinction between thinking about a topic (for example, what is property) and
thinking about how to think about a topic (for example, how we ought
to think about what property is); the distinction is between methodology (how we might think about a topic) and content (the topic itself).
My book presents a way of thinking about the private law of property,
which distinguishes it from theories that seek to describe what property is. In the book, I harness a series of ideas about how owners,
non-owners, legal officials, and citizens ought to think about the questions raised in private law and about questions raised when the government regulates decisions about land use. These ideas include the
concept of the owner as decision maker, the constraints on decision
making that come from social recognition, the obligation to be otherregarding, and the veil of ignorance as a way of thinking about how to
be other-regarding. To that end, Part II of this reflection discusses the
panelist’s views on my theory of social recognition, the veil of ignorance as a thought experiment, and the relationship between moral
psychology and moral philosophy.
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I.

POLITICS

AND

PROPERTY THEORY

There is an important distinction between thinking about property
rights and thinking about how to think about property rights. The
former focuses on what the rights are; the latter on how one identifies
the determinants of the rights. The former focuses on concepts that
constitute the field; the latter focuses on how we determine the normative content of those concepts.1 The former focuses on property
doctrine; the latter on the determinants of property doctrine.
The theory I strove to articulate is a theory about how to think
about thinking about property rights. My objective was not to explore
the concept of property, but to explore a way of thinking about the
concept of property. My objective was not to explore property doctrine but to explore a way of thinking about the determinants of property doctrine and then to illustrate how those determinants provide a
basis for settling disagreements about how the doctrine ought to be
understood. Property is not, for me, exclusion or use, it is a way of
thinking about exclusion or use. That is why I call my theory a framework theory. It is non-conceptual and non-doctrinal, although the
framework, I hope, explains a way of thinking about property concepts and doctrine that allows one to understand the normative and
descriptive foundations of the field.
I wrote Property Law and Social Morality to explore a view of the
private law of property that emanates from the responsibility of owners (or its absence) rather than from an owner’s rights, but that avoids
the idea that rights and responsibilities arise from different normative
sources.
Before my book, and even after, property theorists appear to be
divided into two camps–the rights camp and the responsibility
camp–that attack property’s private law incarnations from different
perspectives.2 Rights theorists emphasize the right to exclude, the economic or labor origins of property, and limitations on government
regulation;3 responsibility theorists emphasize limitations on the right
to exclude, the state’s role in creating property, and the government’s

1. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Structure and Value in
the Common Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (2015) (distinguishing between a concept as a
structural entity that helps organize legal thought and the normative content of a
concept, which determines its application). My belief is that thinking about the structural meaning of concepts and thinking about their normative content are different
forms of reasoning. My work seeks to understand the latter form of reasoning.
2. The two approaches are surveyed in a Special Issue of the Cornell Law Review: The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORN. L. REV. 745
(2009) (containing articles reflecting the rights view and the responsibility view).
3. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV.
1691 (2012).
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responsibility to shape and regulate property.4 For one side, property
tastes great; for the other, it is less filling.
Both views are internally valid, of course, because the responsibility-view and the rights-view are opposite sides of the same coin. A
property right emphasizes the absence of an obligation, while a limitation on a right emphasizes the existence of an obligation. Because
property is a limited right, it is obviously driven by both a concept of
rights and a concept of responsibility. Theorists write about the same
thing, but they appear to be approaching the topic from irreconcilable
perspectives, and the debate seems to require a participant to choose
a perspective before the participant can say anything meaningful
about property. This dichotomy risks making property theory a matter of politics rather than a neutral normative evaluation.
Now, clearly, property is political; by its nature, it pits the haves
against the have-nots. I do not doubt that. But the question I address
in my book is whether the private law of property—cases that arise
when one individual makes a claim against another individual (exclusion, nuisance, and jointly owned property)—necessarily implicates
political positions about rights and responsibilities, as if private law
were just a form of legislative judgment about the relative weight of
rights and responsibilities in various contexts. The answer I provide is
that there is a way of thinking about private law that relies on nonideological, non-political analysis, one that does not prejudge the outcome of any particular controversy by loading it with predetermined
political starting points.5
A.

Distributive Justice and Human Flourishing

The distinction between political and a-political analysis lies behind
the way I distinguish corrective and distributive justice, a distinction
that is important to the book, and, I think, to property theory in general. Whatever the diverse usages of those terms,6 I hope that property theorists draw a distinction between the obligations that we owe
each other as individuals and the obligations that we, as a community
owe (as Professor Claeys puts it) to “guarantee that property is dis4. See, e.g., Joseph W. Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L. J.
1287 (2014).
5. I am trying, in other words, to answer a question posed by Joseph W. Singer
almost thirty years ago: “How can we engage in normative legal argument without
either reverting to the formalism of the past or reducing all claims to the raw demands
of political interest groups?”; Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L.
REV. 465, 468 (1988).
6. I accept Eric Claeys’ friendly amendment that one can appreciate my book as
a theory of justice without labeling the theory in a way that may confuse readers who
carry divergent meanings of the terms corrective and distributive justice. Eric R. Claeys, On Corrective Justice and Rights in Property: A Comment on Property Law and
Social Morality, 2 TEX. A&M J. REAL PROP. L. 2, 218 (2015). Nonetheless, for reasons given in the text, I believe that differentiation between concepts of justice is
important under some nomenclature.
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tributed throughout the society so that everyone is supplied with a
certain level of material means.”7 The first I call corrective justice; the
second I call distributive justice.8 The distinction is between distributing rights to existing owners—determining what responsibility owners
and non-owners owe each other—and distributing property itself—
determining what responsibility the community has to individuals who
lack sufficient property.
Although many property scholars, including some symposium contributors, use the term distributive justice to refer to both kinds of
relationships, I assume they also understand that the distributive justice guiding the distribution of rights in interpersonal relationships is
different from the distributive justice that guides the distribution of
ownership from one person to another in the name of the community.9 The two kinds of distribution, because they involve different
kinds of relationships, invoke different methodologies for thinking
about justice. The distinction between what we owe others in our relationship with them and what the community owes less fortunate individuals reflects a distinction between subject matter domains and
methodologies; my decision to distinguish them (by calling one corrective justice) reflects my belief that methodology ought to match appropriately the domain it is addressing. The obligations that we owe
each other as individuals, the topic of my book, are methodologically
and institutionally distinct from the obligations that we, collectively,
owe to members of the community who have insufficient property or
who have been unjustly deprived of property.
As I elaborate throughout this reflection, when a judge must respond to the claim that one individual makes against another individual over the division of rights and responsibilities, political judgments
and values should not come into play. Those cases ought to be decided within a framework of neutral, non-political values that depend
on evaluating the relations between the parties in light of values that
shape how people ought to treat each other in relationships.10 On the
7. Claeys, supra note 6, at 215.
8. See, e.g., Steven Walt, Eliminating Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1311
(2006) (discussing standard conceptions of different kinds of justice outside of property scholarship).
9. The law distributes rights and ownership in a number of settings, including
adverse possession, nuisance, and the rights of co-owners. The use of the term distribution is literally accurate but does not invoke the kind of justice that one must implement when determining the community’s obligations to less fortunate individuals.
10. That is why I characterize Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five TwentyFive, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) as a case of corrective justice.
When a landowner sues a neighbor for proposing to build a tower that would block a
landowner’s sunlight, the dispute is in the subject matter domain of corrective justice
by virtue of it being a dispute between individuals that asks the court to justly divide
their claims to use or block the sun. That is also why I characterize State v. Shack, 277
A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) as a case of corrective, not distributing justice. The dispute was
about the relationship between a landowner and workers living on the land, not about
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other hand, when the community decides what duty it owes to those
with insufficient property, the community makes an explicitly political
decision about the impact of wealth disparities on social cohesion,
raising questions that are inimical to the common law process. Importantly, the theory of equality underlying my theory does not track the
theory of equality underlying decisions about how and when a community redistributes property. Distributive justice aims not for equality in treatment—equal respect for projects and preferences—but for
equality in opportunity and capability.11
The political, legislative process is, as Christopher Serkin reminds
us,12 one of aggregating private interests within an institutional framework that allows for both Madisonian public interest and self-serving
political ends. Because the legislative process entails identifying interests and trading them off against countervailing interests, political
analysis does not need a common currency based on values; the outcome is determined by political (interest-based) voting, rather than
neutral, value-based assessments. Corrective, interpersonal justice, by
contrast, starts only with the goal of correctly defining how individuals
ought to treat each other as a way of determining whether one person
has wronged another; it does not otherwise prejudge the law’s goals or
how individual interests ought to be aggregated.13
Accordingly, my belief is that private law is not political in the sense
that legislative distributive decisions are, and that private law can be
understood to flow from a common set of values: the values that people would share if they were thinking appropriately, from behind the
veil of ignorance, about their relationships with others. This is an important institutional point. Courts have no business making political
or ideological decisions about redistributing property rights to assist
those in need because distributive justice is a political, not a judicial,
decision, and decisions about distributive justice may properly be
the distribution of wealth among individuals. See infra, text accompanying and following notes 26-28.
11. Samuel Scheffler, The Practice of Equality, in Social Equality: ESSAYS ON
WHAT IT MEANS TO BE EQUAL (C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, & I. Wallimann-Hellmer
eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2015) (discussing the two concepts of equality that are mentioned in this paragraph).
12. Christopher Serkin, From Social Recognition of Property to Political Recognition by the State: Peter Gerhart’s Property Law and Social Morality and the Evolution
of Positive Rights 2 TEX. A&M J. REAL PROP. L. 2, 291 (2015); PETER M. GERHART,
PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 253, 304 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014 Indeed, it is the character of the legislative process that induces me to recommend that
the Due Process Clause be invoked to limit legislation that treats owners unequally.
13. Eric Claeys correctly notes that some corrective justice theorists apply the
term only to the correction of a wrong that is independently determined. Claeys,
supra note 6, at 215. In this view, corrective justice does little work and requires little
by way of theory. Readers of the book could not have mistaken the fact that I rejected this narrow view of corrective justice because the theory is clearly about how
we define a wrong in interpersonal relationships; see GERHART, supra note 12, at
22–24.
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made only by political branches.14 Courts interpret statutes and constitutions or do corrective justice through private law, but they ought
to decide in a way that is a-political and that turns on social values, not
individual interests.
The limited scope of my theory creates a disjunction between my
book and the commentators who thought that I was pronouncing a
general theory of justice in property.15 Moreover, the labels I used to
distinguish our obligations as private citizens from our obligations as
citizens of a community are not accepted by all the commentators.16
But I hope that my distinction between political and non-political
questions becomes clear in these reflections.
We all agree that a system of private property, if its goal is social
cohesion, must be embedded in an institutional framework that addresses both the powers that owners have and the question of who
gets to be an owner, the distinction aptly articulated by Laura Underkuffler17 and impressively argued by Kristen Barnes.18 Accordingly, we cannot fully understand private property without
understanding how the law embeds private property in a system of
progressive income and estate taxes, social safety nets, monopoly regulation, and labor laws, all of which have to do with how the distribution of ownership affects social cohesion. A theory of human
flourishing captures that institutional, distributive framework by recognizing the difficulty of flourishing without property and other social
support systems that enable one to accumulate capital, address risks,
and maximize effective choices. No doubt, something is lost by my
choice to separate theories of justice in property, and to address only
one of those theories, but something may also be gained.
If I am correct that the determinants of obligations between individuals are different from the determinants of community-based obligations, then I think there is something to be gained by addressing the
14. Id. Even within the shifting meanings of the idea of corrective justice, it surprises me to know that some people would attribute the term corrective justice to the
main body of the writings of libertarians like Robert Nozick and Richard Epstein; see
e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 54, 149 (Basic Book 1974).
When these authors refer to rights of owners against other owners or non-owner they
are engaged in an exercise of corrective justice; when they discuss the right of the
collective to take property from some people and give it to others, they provide an
account of distributive justice, even if it is anti-distribution.
15. Kristen Barnes has important insights about several important topics, including the centrality of starting points, inequalities that become replicated over time,
unequal access to property, and siting decisions. Kristen Barnes, Recognition and Reflection, 2 TEX. A&M J. REAL PROP. L. 2, 187–192 (2015). These insights seek a
theory of justice that is wider than the one I undertook to write.
16. See, e.g., Serkin, supra note 12, at 291 (explaining that “the government allocation of burdens and benefits in society . . ..cannot help but implicate distributive
concerns.”).
17. Laura S. Underkuffler, A Moral Theory of Property, 2 TEX. A&M J. REAL
PROP. L. 2, 311 (2015).
18. Barnes, supra note 15, at 187.
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two forms of justice separately. The advantage is methodological—
developing the correct way of thinking about social relationships that
reflect the different nature of those relationships. As I hope to show
in this reflection, I fear that too often property theory mixes political
decisions with non-political decisions and thereby advances propositions that are true in one context but not another.19 For example, the
theory of human flourishing invokes both corrective/interpersonal justice and redistributive justice, and the question I raise by the distinction I draw is whether theory ought to more finely distinguish these
two aspects of justice.
Certainly, the theory espoused in my book ought to be considered a
part of a theory of human flourishing because it deals with the important question of how individuals treat each other. Yet I do not start
with a theory of flourishing because the key question in the domain I
am addressing is how to make judgments about human flourishing
when one person makes decisions that diminish the flourishing of another. To me, this requires the kind of comparison of flourishing (or
well-being) that is derived from the application of the equality principle, which starts from the position that just interpersonal comparisons
have a quality to them that maximizes human flourishing in interpersonal relations.20 When a theory of human flourishing addresses redistributive questions, however, it is asking questions about
comparing an individual’s capabilities and resources, not her equal interpersonal treatment.
Separating the interpersonal and redistributive aspects of a flourishing community also has the advantage of allowing us to envision a
time when they might merge. I do not claim that societies cannot hold
redistributive values in their interpersonal relations; my claim is that
19. In a case like State v. Shack, 277 A 2d 369 (N.J. 1971), where social workers
were granted access to a farm to serve migrant workers, it is easy to say that the case
is about human flourishing, but it is not clear whether this case was decided on the
basis of interpersonal values or redistributive values. See infra, text at, and following,
notes 26– 28 I agree with Laura Underkuffler, supra note 17, at 311 that an individual
who hoards all the food is acting immorally, but I question the determinants and institutional setting of the additional idea that persons deprived of the food have a claim
at common law; see infra, text accompanying note 21.
20. I fear that Professor Claeys’ endorsement of the priority of human flourishing
over the priority of equality, Claeys, supra note 6, at 222, reflects a bias for the productive uses of property, rather than for the right of owners to decide how to use their
property on the basis of their own view of a life well-lived. Consider the difficult
question of awarding an entitlement to one who wants to build a tower that will block
a neighbor’s sunlight, the question presented in Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. FortyFive Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959). Professor Claeys
believes it is important that most people would privilege development over passive
use, which seems to smuggle productivity and productive labor into the award of the
entitlement. Moreover, that analysis misses an important point. The question is not
whether the defendant may build the tower; the question is whether the defendant
must compensate the owner deprived of the sun, which would mean that the cost of
the harm would be built into the cost of the tower. I agree that the cost need not be
built in, but not because we care about the productive uses of property.

2015]REFLECTIONS ON PROPERTY AS A SOCIAL GOOD 321
thus far in the development of private law, those values have not matured to be legally enforceable. I do not doubt that it is wrong under
an appropriate theory of justice for one person to hoard all the food,
but I do not think that is a wrong toward any one person, nor that a
court will entitle one person to sue the hoarder for disgorgement, nor
grant standing to the community to claim a group wrong.21 And I
think that a distributive basis for the legislature to require the hoarder
to disgorge his wealth does not imply that there is a basis for doing so
at the insistence of any particular member of the community. Perhaps
the day will come when such hoarding violates social norms applied to
interpersonal relationships, but we will only know when that is true by
honoring the division I drew.
B.

Rights and Obligations

Accordingly, I wanted to develop a theory with two characteristics.
First, I wanted a theory of rights and responsibilities that flow from
commonly held values rather than disparate interests.22 I did not want
a theory that pitted rights against responsibility but one that charts the
boundary between rights and responsibility, and does so on the basis
of a single idea about how we ought to treat each other. Second, I
wanted to develop a theory that avoids the kind of excessive generalizations that are useful in political arguments but not in making normative legal decisions, generalizations about the importance of private
property and the right to exclude, on the one hand, or the importance
of non-discriminatory access or avoiding injury to neighbors on the
other. I wanted, in other words, to avoid analyzing particular
problems using general statements about rights and obligations, and
instead to analyze particular problems as contextual applications of a
single idea about what obligations we owe other individuals. As my
book says, the right of a storeowner to exclude an African-American
customer from the store does not depend on general beliefs about the
right to exclude and the right of access, or on general beliefs about
discrimination and non-discrimination. It depends on implementing a
way of appropriately thinking about the details of the exclusion that
determine, in a particular context, whether the exclusion is based on
neutral, normatively-appropriate grounds.23
How, then, do we develop a theory that de-politicizes private property law and rests on values rather than interests, one that is open to
21. GERHART, supra note 12, at 116–22 (explaining that the common law developed no cause of action against monopoly; the laws against engrossing were legislative). See MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION (3d ed. 1990).
22. The relationship between interests and values is complex, of course, because
values depend on, and arise from, the way that society and the law treat disparate
interests. But values transcend interests because how a society treats the clash of interests requires members of the community to surrender their narrow self-regarding
interests in order to achieve a measure of social cohesion.
23. GERHART, supra note 12, at 69.

322

TEXAS A&M J. OF REAL PROPERTY LAW

[Vol. 2

contextual nuance, and that identifies with particularity the factors
that are relevant when deciding individual cases? My book advances
the view that values come from how we treat each other in interpersonal relationships (social morality) when we are at our best, and the
view that identifying the determinants of particular judicial decisions
requires a framework theory that provides the tools for making ideologically-free arguments and decisions. I did not purport to develop a
theory that puts an end to disputes about the private law of property,
but, instead, sought a theory that identifies, in particular contexts, the
ideas and values around which we ought to organize and advance our
disagreements.
One must, of course, start somewhere, which is difficult given the
circularity of rights and responsibilities. When an owner has unlimited rights, it is because the owner has no responsibility to others, and
if an owner has responsibility to others, the owner’s rights are limited.
That is why I address this question: Does it matter whether we start
with rights and think about their limitations or whether we start with
responsibility and reason about when an owner does not have responsibility? Should the causal arrow run from rights to responsibility or
the other way around?
For several reasons, my book suggests that the arrow ought to run
from responsibility to rights because a theory of responsibility has the
advantage, which a rights theory does not have, of insulating property
(in its private law incarnation) from politics.
The rights-view provides no internal limits on the scope of rights; it
makes every private law decision about the scope of rights look like a
political decision that either upholds the rights of owners or balances
gains and losses between the parties. Accordingly, the rights view has
no natural ending place—no principled way of determining limitations
on rights. We can think in terms of a right to exclude, of course, but
nobody believes that right to be unlimited.24 And we can think in
terms of the right to resist government regulation, but everyone understands that the government has the right to regulate land use, limited only in some poorly-defined way. The rights-view misses a
coherent and organic sense of boundaries—a view of where and how
we find an end to the owner’s right to exclude or the government’s
right to regulate. Ironically, a rights-based property law is without a
theory of boundaries.
Because a rights-theory contains no natural limitations on rights
that arise from the source of the rights, a private law theory based on
24. I take it that the proponents of the right to exclude now admit this. See, e.g,
Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2060, 2067 (2012) (although exclusion is a necessary condition “framing the critical set of attributes in
terms of exclusion obscures the intuitive understanding of what ownership entails,”
which requires that we reframe the issue in terms of “residual management
authority”).
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rights creates a vacuum that makes property law a matter of politics
rather than normative values. Under a rights-theory, any limits on the
rights must come from some value that is opposed to the rights, and
this requires a decision maker to take a political position. One must
choose between a pro-property perspective, which holds that the
owner’s right to exclude generally trumps a non-owner’s access, or an
anti-property perspective, which holds that the right to exclude
should, in every case, be balanced against a non-owner’s right to access. These choices set up political, not principled, arguments—matters of political preference rather than neutral values.
Similarly, when looking for the boundaries of government regulation, the current focus on a multi-factor balancing test means that
every case is a balancing case, with few known boundaries.25 My
claim, again, is that a theory of rights-in-property contains no identifiable basis from which limitations on government power can be derived. As I will argue below, courts would, in all cases, have to
balance disparate and incommensurate values, leaving a basically lawless state of affairs. From a property-rights perspective, the fuzzy
boundary gives owners negotiating advantage and the ability to make
a wide variety of arguments. From an anti-property view, the doctrine
limiting government regulation subjects the government to a hold-up
whenever the government regulates land usage. But how do we know
whether we should be pro-or anti-property?
Rather than viewing property as a right, my book starts with a theory of obligations–what we owe each other—and develops a theory of
boundaries that depends on what obligations we do, and do not, owe
each other. But obligations are a starting place not because they are
important in themselves (as political markers) but because they define
the boundary between rights and obligations. Rights are derived
from, and depend on, the absence of obligations, while limitations on
rights are derived from the existence of obligations. The right to exclude exists when an owner has no obligations to others; it is limited
when an owner does have obligations. The government’s right to regulate depends on what obligations the government, as representative
of the collective, owes to citizens before it regulates. My theory starts
with obligations, but is a theory of property rights because rights and
their limitations flow from a common source—a theory of what we
owe each other.
25. As my book argues, when the government engages in a permanent physical
occupation of property, it has taken the right to exclude, which collapses regulatory
takings into the Takings Clause itself. GERHART, supra note 12 at 286. Even the socalled per se tests that are thought to be a part of the regulatory takings doctrine leave
boundaries blurred; see, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
(establishing the idea that the government may not deprive the owner of the total
economic value of the property, which leaves undetermined the question of what elements of value count as economic value).
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In elaborating on these themes, let me show the attractiveness of a
responsibility-based account of property law with respect to an
owner’s right to exclude and the government’s right to regulate.
C.

The Right to Exclude

The suggestion that the essence of property is the right to exclude
makes a political statement about the importance of property in a political system, not a statement about legal doctrine. The reality is that
sometimes the right to exclude is limited and if we are to avoid making property theory about political generalizations, we must explain
why and when the right to exclude is limited. To advance a theory of
rights limitations that is not a political theory, we must advance a theory that pays attention to values that shape the right to exclude rather
than the outcomes that we find to be politically salient.
As I have already mentioned, the rights view feeds the political
view of law because it provides no basis for understanding the way in
which rights can give rise to their own limitations. If the right to exclude just exists, and does not arise from some other aspect of human
relations, how are we to know when and why it is limited? Without a
theory of where rights come from, the scope of rights must necessarily
be based on a political decision about the importance of claimed rights
compared to the claims made by those who would limit the rights—a
disagreement like that between the haves and the have-nots.
That is why State v. Shack26 serves as the Rorschach test for our
understanding of property law. A farm owner who hired and housed
migrant workers on his farm denied access to social workers who
wanted to provide social services to the migrant workers; the court
held the owner’s denial of access to be an improper exercise of the
right to exclude. As Eric Claeys maintains, on the surface, the court’s
limitation on the right to exclude might seem to be influenced by the
poverty of the migrant workers, and it could be that the court created
a right of access to recognize their poverty. That has led commentators to take two divergent perspectives on the decision. To some—
those who would emphasize the limitations on an owner’s rights—the
decision reflects the importance of the balancing view–the idea that
the right to exclude must be balanced against the importance of access
by non-owners.27 For others, the case was an aberrational limitation
on the right to exclude, one influenced by the political ideology of the
judges—a marginal case determined only by the special social needs
of the migrant workers.28 For both sides, State v. Shack is an exercise
26. State v. Shack, 277 A. 2d 369, 372 (N. J. 1971).
27. See, e.g., Joseph W. Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 899, 974 (2009).
28. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY 67 (“The New Jersey
Supreme Court is somewhat of an outlier in this and other cases. . . .”). My book
shows that this is incorrect; GERHART, supra note 12, at 170 (every court but one that
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in distributive justice, although one side disparages the case and the
other side embraces the case in the name of distributive justice.
Both perspectives are, in my view, mistaken. The outcome should
be neither praised nor scorned on the ground that social workers seeking to help the poor won the right of access. Rather, the case is about
the relationship between an owner and the workers whom the owner
had invited on his property, a straightforward application of the idea
that relationships give rise to obligations. It is a mainstream, not a
marginal decision, and it turns on interpersonal relationships (and
therefore corrective justice) rather than on distributive justice. One
should not mistake the broad distributive language the court used in
its opinion for the accurate analytical grounds of the decision, one that
arises from a model of exclusion that recognizes obligations based on
relationships.
Under the theory my book presents, one must first determine
whether an owner has obligations to the person seeking access (that is,
whether the court will adopt an exclusion regime). That is not a distributive question in terms of redistributing property to the less fortunate—because it is determined, in my view, not by the relative wealth
of the parties but by their interpersonal relationship. Courts enforce
the right to exclude when the owner has no obligations to non-owners,
and they do not approach that decision by balancing the interests of
owner and non-owner. In that decision, the poverty of the migrant
workers ought to have no bearing; a poor person may not pick an
apple from Bill Gates’s orchard and claim it as his on the basis of their
relative wealth. But when courts find a preexisting relationship between the parties that implies obligations between them (as in the case
of landlord-tenant or employer-employee), they shift from an exclusion regime to a balancing regime. Then, the importance of a nonowner’s access to the property becomes relevant, which explains why
the court in State v. Shack referenced the plight of the migrant
workers.
One might still think of the result as an implementation of distributive justice, for the court is clearly distributing entitlements between
owner and non-owner. As my book points out, many property theorists use the term distributive justice in that literal way, but it is a
different kind of distributive justice from the kind that leads to redistribution. The migrant workers got no ownership rights in property
and property was not being distributed, so the case could not be about
distributive justice in the classic sense. And, as I have already emphasized, if Bill Gates’s yacht washes up on someone’s property, Bill
Gates is permitted to go on the property to retrieve it, even if the
has addressed the issue has sided with the plaintiffs who wanted to provide social
services to the migrant workers; the only court that did not grant the right of access
did so on the ground that the social workers could have access to the migrant workers
outside the property).
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owner is very poor and would benefit greatly from forcing Mr. Gates
to pay for the privilege of access.
D.

The Right to Regulate

The boundary problem in property law is most dramatic when it
comes to limitations on government regulation of land use—the area
of property law that generates public political debates. And, in few
other areas is it as important to pay attention to methodology. The
current doctrine suggests that if regulation has gone “too far,” the
government must compensate owners as if the government had actually taken the property (as opposed to just regulating its use). I would
replace the doctrine with an enhanced due process analysis. Christopher Serkin elegantly defends the current doctrine on the ground,
among others, that the regulatory takings doctrine may actually enhance the potential of government regulation.29 He has behind him
the weight of current judicial and scholarly wisdom (and some logic).
I have the weight of methodology.
My book seeks to identify the boundaries of our debate in two
ways: by characterizing the nature of the problem that the regulatory
takings doctrine addresses and by relocating the definition of what a
regulatory taking is.
For me, the regulatory takings problem arises as a third category of
property problems, taking its place beside the problems of interpersonal justice between individuals and the redistribution of resources.
In the first category, individuals have claims against each other to be
treated equally (corrective justice); in the second category, individuals
have claims against the community (as represented by the government) to an adequate minimum level of property (distributive justice);
and, in the third category, the community (as represented by its government) has regulatory claims against owners so that owners do not
use their property in a way that harms collective interests. I likened
this third category to corrective justice because the contest, like the
contest between two individuals, can be modeled as a contest between
government regulators and regulated landowners. In this arena, the
government is not redistributing property in the distributive justice
sense of providing minimal levels of property; when an owner is forbidden from developing her land, no land is redistributed. Rather the
government is determining rights and obligations between owners and
the community in order to address collective concerns. My notion is
that modeling this as a kind of corrective justice problem correctly
models the bilateral relationship that corrective justice was designed
to address, with the legislature mediating between diverse collective
interests and individual rights.
29. Serkin, supra note 12, at 292–93.
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As for the domain of the regulatory takings doctrine, I would narrow the contested terrain as follows:
a. When the government takes the common law right to exclude, as it
does when it requires apartment owners to allow cable companies to
mount their cables on the apartment building, the government ought
to be required to pay compensation because that regulation is a taking
of property (it is not just tantamount to a taking).30 That is now the
law, and my modest suggesting (now endorsed by the Supreme Court)
is that we call it what it is—a taking—rather than a regulatory
taking.31
b. When the government grants the landowner a benefit to which the
landowner is not entitled, but imposes a condition or exaction as the
price of granting the benefit, the legality of the exaction ought to be
addressed under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, not
under regulatory takings doctrine. As Professor Serkin correctly
notes, this excludes from the regulatory takings doctrine an enormous
swath of modern land use controls, including not just exactions but
also exclusionary zoning, special assessments, and other specific demands that the government makes of owners as a price of getting a
benefit from the government.32 The justification for this position is
methodological; we ought to think about how to think about a problem before we address it because our goal is to categorize social
problems within boundaries that reflect the appropriate methodology
for addressing them. We want to avoid putting a square peg into a
round analytical hole. Exactions in land use regulation are unjustified,
if at all, under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and ought to
be subject to the same method of analysis that inhabits the idea of
unconstitutional conditions.33 Exactions and similar land use regulations may look like a taking, and are linguistically connected to the
idea of an overreaching government, but the social problems that exactions raise are distinct from the problem of determining whether
30. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. V. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980) (holding that a
shopping center may be denied the right to exclude people who would use the shopping center as a public forum and that the limitation on the right to exclude is not a
taking because it is decided under the kind of relational doctrine that determines the
boundaries of the common law right to exclude; it is only when the government takes
a common law right to exclude that compensation is required).
31. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 325–26 (2002).
32. Serkin, supra note 12, at 296.
33. See generally, Mitchell N. Berman, Abuse of Property Right Without Political
Foundations: A Response to Katz, 124 YALE L. J. F. 42, 55 (2014) (articulating relationship between withholding welfare funds, offering zoning variances, or offering a
plea bargain on the condition of giving up rights); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283, 1316–33 (2013); Mitchell N. Berman,
Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90
GEO. L. J. 1, 32–36 (2001).
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government regulation is close enough to a taking to be called a
taking.
c. All other government land use regulation ought to be analyzed
under an enhanced Due Process Clause, not the regulatory takings
doctrine.34
Turning to the last category, which is the subject of controversy, my
position turns on the argument that the regulatory takings doctrine
imposes no discernable legal boundaries on government regulation; it
is “muddled” because it misunderstands the problems generated by
government regulation and looks in the wrong place to address the
problems. Contrary to the regulatory takings doctrine, the Constitution, in my view, did not establish the government as the guarantor of
property’s value because the concept of property does not include the
right to any particular value; the owner takes property subject to risks
and rewards of unpredictable origins. The regulatory takings doctrine
also imposes large social costs because it is, in a sense, lawless; the law
offers no discernible boundaries to determine the permissible scope of
government regulation, and this lawlessness imposes a social cost in
the form of uncertainty and wasted investments in fruitless litigation.
Continuing with my law-as-politics theme, the regulatory takings doctrine interjects politics into what ought to be an apolitical determination of how private property rights and community rights should
interact.
I will not develop the point that the regulatory takings doctrine is
indeterminate; the literature supports me and defenders of the regulatory takings doctrine do not seem seriously to deny it.35 I want to
hone in on the issue of how we ought to think about limits of government regulation.
Professor Serkin has declined my invitation to rethink limitations
on government regulation through the lens of the Due Process Clause
rather than the (to me) hollow doctrine of regulatory takings. That is,
in my view, unfortunate, because few are as qualified as Professor
Serkin to rethink the limits that the Constitution places on land use
regulation under the kind of due process analysis that I recommend.
Perhaps Professor Serkin is unduly influenced by traditional and conventional views about the use of due process as a limit on government
action—the idea that substantive due process puts few limits on economic regulation and that procedural due process simply requires the
government to run the high hurdles; procedural due process might

34. In other words, regulations that reduce the value of property are not takings.
Australia has the correct approach. See, e.g., JT Int’l SA v. Commonwealth [2012]
HCA 43 (Austl.) (no taking when legislation banned the use of valuable trade dress in
selling cigarettes).
35. See GERHART, supra note 12.
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slow the government down, but it does not stop the government.36 My
book does not endorse either of those views.
Instead, I tried to sketch (and it is only a sketch) a view of due
process that embodies an understanding that is neither substantive in
the old (and forgiving) means-ends way, nor procedural in a high hurdles, jump-through-the-hoops way. Instead, I tried to exploit recent
scholarship from outside the property area that would, adopting an
older view of due process, evaluate government regulation against
standards of equality, institutional competency, and separation of
powers. The nub of the argument is that legislatures and administrators are restricted in non-exaction land use planning not because the
Constitution protects the value of property against government action,
but because owners are guaranteed equal treatment and protected
against administrative and legislative failure. The idea that the legislature or its delegate may not take from A and give to B is not a takings
concept. It is a due process concept because it embodies separation of
power restrictions on the adjudicative power of the legislature and administrative agencies. Moreover, due process suggests that the government may not regulate an owner of wetlands without also
regulating owners who are in a relevantly equal position. This is not
about protecting value; it is a check on the legislature’s political
overreaching.
My proposal would, of course, threaten what we might call the “regulatory takings industry,” the phalanx of land use lawyers inside and
outside the government whose expertise lies in arguing about whether
government regulation takes too much value. It became clear during
our symposium discussions that there is a thriving business in which
developers and the government negotiate over government compensation when the government regulates land use, and that these negotiations, by the arguments and settlements they entail, form a kind of
“law” of regulatory takings. If I am right that the positive law of regulatory takings (as reconfigured above) is highly indeterminate, then
the negotiators are not negotiating in the shadow of the law (by hypothesis there is none); they are negotiating the law itself by negotiating around a set of settlement norms that develop over time in
response to changing perceptions of the cost of litigation and the value
of alternative uses of property. In that event, it is not what courts say
the law is that matters; what matters is what settlement negotiators
say and the impact of what they say on the other negotiators. Only
experts familiar with the negotiations know what the law is, and such
lawless negotiations probably leave both developers and the government dissatisfied. But anyone who wants to know the law of regula36. Serkin, supra note 12, at 290 (noting that due process puts only “porous limits”
on the police power and that the government is limited only “to those extreme cases
where the government acts arbitrarily”).
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tory takings would have to sit in on those negotiations to determine
the factors that influence the nature of eventual settlements.
II.

A FRAMEWORK THEORY

A framework theory that articulates how we ought to think about
property should leave room for growth and expansion, and it
welcomes insights that illuminate, illustrate, or challenge parts of the
framework. My particular framework suggests that property is about
the allocation and control of decision making about resources. I also
suggest that we can understand the allocation and control of resources
by the way that society—individuals acting alone but interdependently—recognizes a resource as either private or common property,
recognizes restrictions on the use of property, and recognizes how the
burdens and benefits of ownership ought to be divided when interests
conflict. My framework incorporates a theory about how a community comes to recognize the scope of rights in property—a theory of
social recognition—and a theory about how one validates the normative force of values that a society uses when it confronts decisions
about property. I harness the veil of ignorance as a thought experiment that allows the law to evaluate the moral value of social beliefs
by comparing them to a model of the right way of making decisions
about property in interpersonal affairs.
The theory of social recognition offers an evolutionary view of
property that turns on the relationship between social attitudes toward property and the law’s prescriptions, both of which change interdependently. Sometimes law and social beliefs are in equilibrium,
such that legal rights and obligations seem to be in sync with social
beliefs and values. Sometimes social beliefs and values shift from
under law, which, as David Fagundes reminds us,37 occurs because social beliefs and values are not homogeneous, but socially negotiated
among heterogeneous people. When social beliefs and values change
(for the entire group or for a subgroup), the disequilibrium between
social beliefs and legal requirements must be mediated if the law is to
be obeyed without heavy enforcement costs. The threat of resistance
and disobedience vie with coerced compliance; the disequilibrium is
mediated by changes in law or social beliefs. Several of the symposium speakers offered important insights and questions about the details of the framework theory: the theory of social recognition, the
question of values, and the relationship between how people act and
how they ought to act.

37. David Fagundes, Property, Morality, and Moral Psychology: Comments on
Gerhart’s Property Law and Social Morality, 2 TEX. A&M J. REAL PROP. L. 2, 234
(2015).
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A.

Social Recognition

In his contribution, Blake Hudson illustrates how the concept of
social recognition helps us understand property as an evolutionary
system that responds to social perceptions about values.38 When trees
were primarily valued for building material, fuel, beauty, or shade, it
was logical that society would recognize trees as private property.
Their value did not generally depend on collective or interdependent
decisions about trees and individuals could decide for themselves what
relative value to put on the various uses of trees.39 As society develops new understanding about ecosystems, however, the social recognition of the value of trees can change, and that change can influence
society’s claims over rights in those trees. When society understands
that the value of trees depends on interdependent decisions about the
uses of trees, society’s views about the appropriate institutional framework for making decisions about the use of trees will evolve.
Therefore, as Professor Hudson states, when trees have value in
providing clean air or water, protecting fisheries, flood control, habitat
preservation, or removing carbon from the air—services that have
public goods characteristics—then decisions about privately owned
trees are interdependent with the decisions of other tree owners. If
this view of the value of trees gains wide recognition, social opinions
about property rights in trees necessarily will change. This emphasizes the importance of allowing the government to recognize the
changing social value of trees and to avoid freezing the government
into socially outmoded views about the proper institutional framework for exercising rights in trees.
Professor Hudson understood perfectly the way in which the social
recognition concept can explain, predict, and guide law reform efforts
that reflect the changing social view of the way in which decisions
about resources ought to be made. Property law is not disconnected
from the society in which it operates, and the social recognition concept presents a framework for thinking about how social perceptions
influence legal and institutional prescriptions. The law cannot afford
to get too far away from the way that people normally make decisions
when thinking about the rights of others and about the rights of the
community. If trees justifiably come to be viewed by society as a common, rather than a private resource, the values that flow from that
perception could be ignored only at the expense of distancing the law
from society.
38. Blake Hudson, Moral Obligations and Natural Capital Commons on Private
Property: Perspectives on Peter Gerhart’s Property Law and Social Morality, 2 TEX.
A&M J. REAL PROP. L. 2, 248–49 (2015).
39. Green space came to be understood as a public good to be provided collectively, either by governments or through conservation easements created through private philanthropy.
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Kali Murray wrote in the same vein to suggest linkages between the
theory in my book and intellectual property law.40 Because I wanted
my theory to break down barriers between our various doctrinal silos,
I admire her impulse. Indeed, not only does the idea of social recognition validate the idea that the patent paradigm is widely accepted, but
my guess is that issues the patent system faces from new technology,
including issues arising from the human genome and patenting “life,”
are shaped, in no small part, by public recognition of relevant distinctions between ideas and invention. Moreover, although the patent
system’s obligations are now often statutory and find their source in
the patent social bargain, I think her instinct is correct that the content
and scope of the obligations depend on the process of thinking that
my framework theory outlines.
Because the patent system is grounded on many obligations that
require a patentee to be other-regarding—most prominently disclosure and non-misuse obligations—the method of thinking about one’s
obligations that my book describes as a moral method of thinking also
describes the method of thinking that the law uses to determine
whether a patent holder has fulfilled her obligations.
B.

Social Morality

My book claims that there is a moral way of thinking about rights in
resources (property rights) when individuals contest entitlements, that
the moral way of thinking about property is drawn from social practices (including social recognition), and that the law is both influenced
by and influences moral reasoning about rights and obligations. Two
of the symposium contributors helpfully pushed me to elaborate on
the mechanisms that relate how people reason about their social interactions to how we reason about law.
Clearly, as Kristen Barnes and David Fagundes forcefully argue, not
all ways of thinking about resources are moral; social thinking can be
mean or wrongheaded. How can a theory of property rely on social
practices, social reasoning, or social values when those values may in
fact be immoral? Moreover, Professor Fagundes urges us to integrate
moral psychology into the framework, which relies primarily on moral
philosophy. Because not everything that humans do is rational, and
because many social practices seem to be morally wrong, how is it that
a social practice can influence a legal practice? How is the law, or any
other discipline that evaluates social behavior, supposed to understand the relationship between facts and norms—between the way the
world works and the way it ought to work?41
40. Kali Murray, What is Owed: Obligation’s Relevance in Property and Intellectual Property Theory, 2 TEX. A&M J. REAL PROP. L. 2, 275 (2015).
41. Notice that these questions do not raise the problem of the Holmesian “bad
man”—the person who knowingly flaunts social norms without justification or reason.
The law must deal with that person whatever the legal or moral norm. While those
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The theory I advance seeks to reconcile what is with what ought to
be by suggesting, again, the conceptual separation between how we
reason about our obligations and the question of what we do as a result of that reasoning. The moral “ought” describes a way of thinking
about the world—an attitude toward others who live in the community—that is universal. Moral reasoning is about the right way of
thinking about appropriate behavior; if our method of reasoning is
moral, the behavior governed by that reasoning is moral. However,
the behavior generated by the right way of reasoning need not be the
same in every context because the right thing to do can vary depending on context and the predicted impact on others. Although the
method of reasoning is universal, moral reasoning is contextual and
therefore capable of yielding behavior that is context-dependent.
This is not a novel observation. We have an obligation to reason in
a moral way about which side of the road we will drive on, but that
reasoning will not universally require that we drive on either the left
side or the right. Indeed, moral reasoning requires that we follow the
local practice. The implementation of the moral way of thinking depends on contextual factors that determine what practices other people adopt, and moral reasoning cannot be separated from those
practices. Moreover, moral reasoning allows us to move to the other
side of the road when that is necessary to avoid the risk of harm to
others.
More generally, moral action depends on local practices because
moral reasoning determines in what way those practices ought to
guide our behavior. If the local practice is that non-owners habitually
and without objection feel free to roam through land that has an
owner but is unoccupied, then a right-thinking owner, when exercising
her right to exclude, would have to account for the values and expectations reflected in that practice. Although the way of thinking morally is universal, the application of that way of thinking cannot be
indifferent to the values reflected in well-formed expectations of citizens. That is why practices that are moral in one society cannot be
translated to another society in the name of morality.
In other words, neither law nor morality can ignore local practices
because the moral way of thinking necessarily is based on the values
underlying local practices. The test of morality is whether reasoning
about one’s conduct takes into account local practices in the appropriate way, not whether a person has adopted a practice or conduct that
is universally prescribed. The moral way of thinking is not contextual,
but the application of that way of thinking is, a point nicely made by
Kwame Anthony Appiah:
deviants are of social concern, the law is formed to guide the behavior of those who
would not flaunt social norms without a reason, and it is to them that we look to
understand the relationship between social practices and legal norms.
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Even if you couldn’t derive an “ought” from an “is” facts would still
be relevant to moral life. Morality is practical. In the end it is about
what to do and how to feel; how to respond to our own and the
world’s demands. And to apply norms, we must understand the empirical contexts in which we are applying them. No one denies that,
in applying norms, you will need to know what, as an empirical matter, the effects of what you do will be on others.42

The conceptual separation of moral reasoning from moral behavior
serves to unify the way the law reasons about its normative requirements with the way that the law expects individuals to reason about
their moral requirements. When the method of reasoning used by the
law and the method of reasoning used by society diverge, the law
seeks to influence the method of reasoning used by society. The law
labels divergent behavior as unreasonable. Moreover, as social practices evolve, the law must react to the method of thinking that determined the evolution; the law must either reject those practices or
incorporate them into the law. Moral reasoning cleanses immoral social beliefs while allowing morally neutral social beliefs to be incorporated into the law. That is why the veil of ignorance stands at the
center of my account of moral reasoning.
Professor Barnes, in her essay, captures perfectly how the mechanism of decision-making behind the veil of ignorance works.43 And
her questions about the veil of ignorance seem to be designed not only
to test the contents of the theory but also to validate the idea behind
the theory. The value of the veil of ignorance is that it forces the
decision maker to be explicit about the factors the decision-maker
takes into account and to justify the relevance and weight given to
those factors. It is as much a value because of the questions and discussion it invites, as it is because of the answers that it provides. In
fact, it barely screams the question: how should I think about this
problem if I am directed to ignore all the factors that reflect my personal interest in its resolution? The method itself forces the decision
maker to confront the kinds of questions that Professor Barnes raises,
and, by raising those questions channels the analysis into the question
of what is the moral way of thinking about the issue the decisionmaker confronts.
In other words, the exercise of thinking from behind the veil of ignorance eliminates decisions that would be based on impermissible
factors; this would include factors such as race, ethnicity, political affiliation, or any other consideration that is not relevant to the merits of
the decision. Operationally, the veil of ignorance describes a thought
process that requires the decision maker to articulate the factors that
are relevant to the decision being made, the reason those factors are
42. KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, EXPERIMENTS IN ETHICS 22 (Harvard Univ. Press
2008).
43. Barnes, supra note 15, at 197.
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relevant, and how those factors ought to be weighed against each
other or aggregated to make the necessary decision. The veil of ignorance thus requires the decision maker to think about how to think
about the decision, and to justify the methodology before the decision
is made. The decision maker must determine which consequences are
relevant to the decision before knowing what conclusions will be implicated by those consequences. Consequences matter in determining
the relevance and weight of various factors, but not in determining the
appropriate way of thinking about the question that must be
answered.
C.

The Is and The Ought

I am grateful to Professor Fagundes for raising the thorny issue of
how my theory accommodates psychological and behavioral experiments that show how people think and act when faced with various
moral and decisional problems. I am also grateful that he recognizes
that my theory is capacious enough to allow the insights from such
experiments to be taken into account in thinking about which interpersonal decisions are moral. Experimental evidence reveals important information about beliefs and values, which form the centerpiece
of the theory I presented. Moreover, because experimental evidence
shows the importance of context and framing, it advances one of the
primary goals of my book: to support a method of thinking that avoids
excessive generality of concept or principle (such as the right to exclude) and to focus instead on the contextual and framing factors that
define the boundaries of the concept or principle.
Psychological insights play several roles in our understanding of
property. On the one hand, psychological motivations for particular
decisions are irrelevant to the law because legality depends on the
objective factors that an ideal decision maker would take into account.
The law is not particularly worried about why a farmer will not let a
mobile home company deliver a mobile home to a neighbor across his
land,44 nor why a farmer is motivated to bar social workers from his
property.45 This illustrates the point that the law expects behavior to
conform to the decision-making method of the ideal decision maker.
What matters are the reasons for action, not their motivations. On the
other hand, as my book emphasizes, and no one doubts, because the
property system is sustained by psychological reactions to the concept
of property, it is important to understand property in terms of cooperation and non-cooperation, which depend on psychological states of
trust and risk-taking.
Psychological insights also explain the value that people find in a
property system. Carol Rose recently surveyed property theories
44. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W. 2d 154 (1997).
45. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971).
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founded on psychological beliefs.46 Importantly, theorizing about the
psychology of owners is more advanced than theorizing about the psychology of non-owners. Ownership is thought to contribute to one’s
identity, to the projection of how one wants to be thought of, to a
sense of security and empowerment, to a sense of generosity, and to
an incentive for economic activity. The psychology of non-ownership
is not so well understood, and descriptions of the psychological state
of non-owners that are based on fear or reciprocity seem
unpersuasive.47
But the larger issue is raised by the disjunction between how
humans really act and how they ought to act. When behavior does not
appear to follow rational thought, or when people’s moral choices diverge from philosophical or legal conceptions of morality, how should
the law, which purports to be founded on a model of behavior that is
both reason-giving and moral, react? How are we to reconcile psychological studies of how people act with philosophical or legal ideas
about how people ought to act?48
As Professor Fagundes says, moral psychology builds from a series
of experiments that reveal the decisions people make when they are
presented with various kinds of moral choices. Experimenters ask:
how do people make decisions when confronted with a moral dilemma and how do those decisions compare with standard accounts of
rational or moral action? Moral psychology challenges moral philosophy by showing that decisions individuals make are contextual and
46. Carol M. Rose, Psychologies of Property (And Why Property Is Not a HawkDove Game) in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY at 272 (J.C. Penner
& Henry E. Smith, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2013) [hereafter Rose, Psychologies of
Property]; see also, J.A. Blumenthal, To Be Human: A Psychological Perspective on
Property Law, 83 TUL. L. REV. 609 (2009).
47. The question about non-owners is why they habitually respect property rights,
even when there is little fear of reprisals or sanctions. As a number of symposium
participants mentioned, it is difficult to distinguish recognition of the values that property represents and acceptance of the power of those with property or the lack of
alternatives. Barnes, supra note 15, at 196; Fagundes, supra note 37, at 235. For her
part, Carol Rose mentions the development of customary practices driven by cultural
values and supported by the idea of reciprocity and (in some cultures) the prospect of
future ownership. But she admits that theorizing about the psychological hold of
property on the behavior of non-owners is incomplete. Rose, Psychologies of Property, supra note 46.
48. The conversation between moral philosophy and moral psychology can be understood by contrasting KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, EXPERIMENTS IN ETHICS (2010)
(an effort at consilience and accommodation between moral philosophy and moral
psychology) with J.M. DORIS & HARMON, LACK OF CHARACTER, PERSONALITY AND
MORAL BEHAVIOR (2002) (skeptical about the idea of virtue ethics in the face of
experimental evidence). Sides are being drawn; see, e.g., Liang Young & Rebecca
Saxs, It is Not Just What You Do, But What’s On Your Mind: A Review of Kwame
Anthony Appiah’s Experiments in Ethics, 3 NEUROSCIENCES 201 (2010) (offering support for Appiah’s analysis); see also Eduardo Machery, The Bleak Implications of
Moral Psychology, 3 NEUROETHICS 223 (2010) (questioning whether philosophers are
justified in concentrating on what kind of a person we should strive to be).
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contingent, which suggests that morality is also contextual and contingent. In the famous trolley experiments, many people will throw a
switch to divert a trolley from one track (on which the trolley would
kill five people) to another track (on which the trolley would kill only
one person). Evidently, people believe that taking action that will result in the death of one individual to save five individuals is morally
appropriate. These same people, however, would not push an individual in front of a trolley (to his death) in order to save five people.
Apparently, an individual’s ideas about causation, agency, and responsibility are different enough in these two situations to change people’s
sense of the right way to act, even though the consequences of action
are the same in the two contexts. How do we reconcile how people
say they would act with our moral intuitions about how they should
act?
More generally, psychological experiments show the laboratory reactions that lead to either cooperation or non-cooperation, and the
contextual features that distinguish the two kinds of reactions. Sometimes experiments show that individuals make instinctive decisions
that, upon reflection behind the veil of ignorance, would not be considered moral or rational. Sometimes psychological decisions reveal
the mechanisms or intuitions that support generosity or other-regarding behavior. People’s decisions are products of their environment,
and context matters.
Assuming that the thought process behind the veil of ignorance can
cleanse the psychological reactions that are based on impermissible
factors, like race or ethnicity, how can knowing how people say they
would react in certain situations help decision makers determine what
the right thing to do is? Do they help resolve the central issue behind
the veil of ignorance, which is to identify the values that are relevant
to making decisions? We address that issue by more deeply exploring
the role of beliefs and values in the law.
Consider first the question of beliefs. Moral psychology has the potential to offer evidence about beliefs that might facilitate the decision
of how to award entitlements. Although most societies accept the
moral idea that individuals should not knowingly harm other members
of their society, the idea of what constitutes harm varies with the type
of social organization, the context, and even social class. A society
believing that an owner who interferes with a neighbor’s access to sunlight is causing harm is going to have a different nuisance law than a
society believing that the loss of access to sunlight is not harmful
enough to require the owner to compensate the neighbor. In this context, we might revisit Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five TwentyFive, Inc.,49 which provided a focal point for some discussion at the
49. See Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
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symposium. Our theory requires us to ask what mode of reasoning
the judge ought to use when assigning an entitlement to one neighbor
or the other (assuming that precedent does not govern the legal question). One can imagine a series of psychological experiments, like the
trolley experiments, that seek to reveal psychological beliefs about
harm and that might inform a judge’s thinking about how to decide
where the cost of harm falls. The experiments would allow us to construct a model of how humans reason about harm that would make
the psychological response a reasoned response of the kind that meets
the obligations of a moral thinker. Under this reasoning, moral philosophy tells us that people are responsible for the harms they cause;
moral psychology tells us how a particular society has constructed the
concept of harm that makes the moral principle operative.
As for values, experimental psychology shows that some means to
permissible ends are psychologically unacceptable to individuals. Because the law correctly examines the means that people use to achieve
their ends, experiments about the means/end relationship can provide
the law with a basis of decision. For example, the concept of unfair
competition, which creates a form of quasi-property, is built on the
idea that although injuring a competitor by taking her customers is
generally privileged, some means of taking away another’s customers
are met with psychological disapproval. Injuring a competitor by lowering prices is privileged; injuring a competitor by taking advantage of
the technology of the telegraph is not.50
More broadly, the law employs fairness norms that determine when
a decision is deemed impermissible. Such fairness norms influence
how people ought to act by influencing the institutions of law and the
market. For example, psychological research shows a fair amount of
social consensus about when people consider a firm’s price increase or
price decrease to be unfair.51 People make judgments about deviations from reference points (or settled expectations) that are contextual. On the one hand, increasing the price of snow shovels after a
sudden, large snowfall is judged to be unfair, as is decreasing the
wages of employees when widespread unemployment lowers the market wage of labor. On the other hand, decreasing the wages of labor
in order to preserve the viability of an enterprise is not thought to be
unfair. Sometimes these conceptions of fairness are incorporated into
law, as when legislatures pass laws that forbid price increases in times
of a sudden shortage.52 At other times, however, the market works to
incorporate these concepts of unfairness. Merchants who increase
50. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
51. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND THINKING SLOW 305–09 (Farrar,
Straus, and Giroux 2011).
52. When the water system of Toledo, Ohio failed, local authorities quickly imposed a ban on increasing the price of bottled water as they worked to increase the
supply of bottled water.
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prices in response to a sudden increase in demand find that they lose
sales. The moral psychological of unfairness becomes an input, but not
controlling input, into the law’s requirements.
As Professor Fagundes points out, experimental psychology shows
that people’s views about what is right and wrong are about more than
just harm and fairness. Views about right and wrong include several
classes of considerations—such as loyalty, authority, purity, and liberty.53 These factors determine the basis on which people will cooperate or not with others, which means that they are relevant to a theory
of law because they show the basis on which people can reach cooperative outcomes. These considerations therefore explain not only the
kinds of psychological responses that the law can harness as it seeks to
aid people in coordinating their activities, but also the psychological
barriers that the law must overcome if it is to successfully advance
social cohesion.
III.

CONCLUSION

Property Law and Social Morality presents a theory of property that
focuses on how we ought to think about the social dimensions of the
private law of property if we are to understand what determines and
justifies property law. By presenting a way of thinking about property
that drives our understanding of what property is, the book models
how lawmakers might think about the decisions they make as they
give content to property doctrine, and also how ordinary citizens
might think about their rights and responsibilities with respect to
other citizens when property controversies arise. The essence of property is found by identifying who gets to make decisions about resources, what factors are relevant to their decisions, and how their
decisions must account for the well-being of others when they have a
duty to take that well-being into account.
The central issue of the private law of property is one of boundaries: the boundary between exclusion and access, between detrimental
competing uses, between private and collective forms of property, between present and future owners, and between owners and the society
in which the owners exercise their decision making discretion. Property Law and Social Morality presents a way of thinking about those
boundaries that I hope will sharpen them and reduce the social costs
of litigation that can be avoided if we think about the boundaries in
the right way.
The participants in this symposium have paid the ideas in my book
great respect by taking the time and care to affirm some and challenge
others, and I greatly appreciate their contributions. One of the byproducts of a symposium such as the one that Texas A&M has organized is that it creates a platform for additional intellectual conversa53. Fagundes, supra note 37, at 236.
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tions, and the possibility of narrowing divergent approaches and
integrating new ideas into a common framework from which we can
identify our differences and advance our understanding of the concept
we call property. I am grateful to the School of Law at Texas A&M
University for making this possible.

